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Abstract: Over the last twenty years, the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union has
evolved into a multifunctional policy instrument. As part of this transformation, most farmer receipts
are paid independently of production, granting this class of payment production-neutral or ‘fully
decoupled’ status. In prospective agricultural market studies, simulation models routinely represent
these payments as decoupled, despite academic evidence to the contrary that posits a number of
‘coupling-channels’. To explore the ramifications of differing degrees of coupling on the three pillars
of sustainability, a natural-resources focused simulation model is employed. Comparing with a
‘standard’ decoupled baseline to 2030, higher coupling increases global agricultural employment
and reduces production intensity on European Union agricultural land and agricultural emissions.
Higher coupling also diminishes the Common Agricultural Policy’s capacity as a safety-net for
European Union food-security and agricultural employment, whilst there is tentative evidence of
increasing emissions ‘leakage’. At the very least, if the non-distorting status of decoupled payments
is mis-specified, this has direct implications for the design of greener policy initiatives under the
auspices of the Green Deal that promote sustainable fairer trade. As a result, further empirical
research on the production distorting effects of the European Union’s decoupled payments is needed.
Keywords: European Union; agricultural policy; coupled support; sustainability; CGE modelling
1. Introduction
At the global level, the United Nations sustainable development goals (SDG) for
the period 2015–2030 provide a support structure to foster international monitoring and
cooperation. The aim is to achieve a target of desirable goals for human development
including improved food security and nutrition, sustainable resource conservation, better
education and health [1]. In meeting the food security and nutrition needs of a rapidly
growing population whilst respecting planetary boundaries, the need for a sustainably
responsible system of food production is paramount [2,3]. To this end, much of the spotlight
focuses on defining the correct role and purpose for the agriculture sector. For its part, the
European Commission set out a vision for green growth under the auspices of the Green
Deal [4]. Within this overarching policy initiative, the ‘Farm to Fork Strategy’ [5], seeks
to promote an agricultural-system that not only steers production decisions in favour of
sound practises, environmental accountability and the minimisation of leakage effects, but
also seeks to reform consumer perceptions of diet and healthy eating.
The European Union (EU) has a long history of reforming its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). In the past, CAP support instruments encouraged higher agricultural produc-
tion, initially with guaranteed prices, then with subsidies paid in proportion (i.e., ‘coupled’)
to farm output levels. This provoked criticism of wasteful agricultural production policies
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and trade-distortion effects on world markets [6,7]. To comply with World Trade Organi-
sation rules, a key structural change to the CAP’s market measures and direct payments,
catalysed by the 2003 reform, was the replacement of coupled payments with a Single
Payment Scheme based on registered land entitlements. Since this transfer payment was
received independently of the farmer’s decision to produce, the link between payment
and production was deemed to be severed, or ‘decoupled’. As a result, changes in CAP
payments would not be trade-distorting, whilst continuing to support EU farming incomes.
The Single Payment Scheme, superseded in the 2013 CAP reform by the Basic Payment
Scheme, remains linked to land entitlements. Importantly, the conditional receipt of said
payment upon the provision of (environmental) public goods under the principle of ‘cross
compliance’, has strengthened, whilst Basic Payment Scheme payment rates have also
converged considerably across EU member states (MS) (For an overview of recent CAP
reforms the reader may consult Swinnen [8,9]).
A cursory review of the scientific literature [10–13], however, identifies several possi-
ble ‘coupling-channels’ between decoupled payments and production. As the security of
the payment is now entirely dependent upon policy makers rather than market conditions,
it is posited that this policy landscape change has affected farmers’ perceptions of risk,
expectations about future payments, improved access to bank credit and the hiring of
on-farm/off-farm labour (For a full discussion of these well-established coupling channels,
the reader may consult Boulanger et al. [12]). Increased income influences on-farm and
off-farm labour supply decisions so that decoupled payments decrease the likelihood of
off-farm work [14] and increase leisure time at the expense of off-farm work as well as
on-farm work cutting agricultural production [15]. For example, Garrone et al. [16] find
a clear negative impact of decoupled payments on off-farm labour migration at the EU
level. This suggests a link between the decoupled payment and the labour factor. As
decoupled payments improve farm income, they increase farm savings and investment.
Decoupled payments may therefore also affect investment decisions by improving the
credit worthiness of credit constraint farmers and their access to capital. Thus, with the
financial cushion of the ‘decoupled’ payment, improved credit worthiness impacts upon
farm investment and production, suggesting a link with the capital factor [11,17]. Moreover,
studies assessing the impact of farmers’ expectations about future payments reveal an
influence of the implementation of decoupled payments on current production and invest-
ment decisions [18–20]. Elsewhere, Koundouri et al. [21] explore the link on coupling via
input usage, whilst Gohin and Zheng [22] examine the premise of how projected financial
certainty from decoupled payments affects perceptions of risk, which in turn influences the
optimal input mix. In this context, Hennessy [23] identifies three risk related effects. De-
coupled payments are an additional source of income and therefore affect farmers’ wealth
and thus reduce risk aversion-wealth effect [24,25]. They stabilise farm income by reducing
income variability-insurance effect [26,27] and a re-link to productions decisions-coupling
effect [28,29]. Meanwhile, also considering risk behaviour and expectations, Sckokai and
Moro [26] present some acreage effects due to decoupled payments, concluding that an
additional share of decoupled payments needs to be allocated to the land factor, though
not fully capitalised into the land rent. Summarising, this literature reveals the indirect
channels between a decoupled land-based payment and the agricultural labour and cap-
ital factors of production. Furthermore, these studies highlight the need for additional
empirical research to determine more precisely how decoupled payments influence farm
production decisions.
Prospective simulation modelling of agricultural sector policies plays a key role in
policy circles. Economic simulation models typically examine how medium- to long-term
deviations from an assumed ‘business as usual’ baseline impact on market prices and
quantities. These deviations may take the form of changes in policy or technology, or
they may even relate to the structural behavioural assumptions of the model. Different
agriculture-focused partial equilibrium and macroeconomic computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) simulation models, with their associated strengths and weaknesses, are able
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to capture the complexities of agricultural factor and product markets to varying degrees.
Given the level of parametric uncertainty generated by the differing coupling-channels and
their respective magnitudes discussed above, there remains potential modelling bias within
the common simulation modelling assumption of assuming a theoretically ‘decoupled’
payment. To illustrate this point for Ireland, the modelling study of Boysen et al. [30]
calibrates the degree of decoupling using available data on agricultural output trends after
the implementation of decoupled support. Likewise, other studies support the notion
that the chosen parametrisation of decoupled payments is a decisive factor for models’
results [31–33].
The aforementioned EU related literature offers valuable insights, although in those
examples where empirical measurement is given, it is restricted to highly specific activities
or geographical groupings. This presents a challenge when employing models with full
EU MS coverage and multiple sectors. On the other hand, in determining the degree of
the decoupled payment tied to the land factor, a handful of related studies [34–36] offer
empirical estimates on the proportion of decoupled payments capitalised into land values
following their introduction within the 2003 CAP reform. Indeed, Ciaian et al. [37] is
the only study that provides empirically estimated capitalisation rates for the pre- and
post-2013 CAP reform period, together with a confidence interval of lower and upper
boundary estimates.
Thus, employing a recognised and respected simulation model, the aim of the current
paper is to implement a sensitivity analysis of this parametric uncertainty using the latest
available plausible estimates from the literature above and reasoned assumptions. The
objective is to examine the extent to which different CAP payment coupling settings affect
the three pillars of sustainability, namely economy, society and environment [38]. To this
end, selection of appropriate market and non-market indicators is employed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model data and
framework, the modelling assumptions for different coupling levels and the experimental
design. Section 3 presents the results of a selection of indicators for the three pillars of
economy, society and environment. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data and Model Framework
The principal research question we seek to answer is how differing degrees of pro-
duction ‘coupling’ and trade distortion impact upon economic, social and environmental
indicators, across EU and non-EU large player regions. An ideal starting point for this
task is the publically available (at cost) Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database [39],
which consists of a detailed and consistent set of tables of transaction values to capture
the economic structure of the world economy. In its ninth incarnation (benchmark year
2011), this dataset contains 57 activities/commodities to characterise each of the 141 re-
gional/national economies. These economies are interlinked by commodity specific gross
bilateral trade flows including market distortions (subsidies/taxes) and transport costs.
At cost-price, producer- and consumer prices, the database therefore records the flows of
goods and services as inputs between industrial uses and finished products both within
and across geographical boundaries. Upon this database, is calibrated a CGE model
that consists of a system of simultaneous mathematical equations. This study employs
an advanced CGE simulation model called the Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium
Tool (MAGNET) [40] (For a full presentation of the MAGNET model, the reader may
consult [41]).
At its core, the MAGNET model is based on the standard GTAP CGE model frame-
work [42] (see Figure 1). Employing ‘convenient’ mathematical functional forms, the GTAP
model applies principles of economic optimisation (i.e., welfare maximisation, cost minimi-
sation) to characterise consumer and producer behaviour to endogenous price changes,
whilst all production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale. A further series of
factor and commodity market clearing equations enforce the condition that supply must
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equal demand, from which equilibrium prices emerge. Finally, to ‘close’ the macro circular
flow, accounting equations ensure that all producers make zero ‘economic’ long run profits,
the value of income from production factors, expenditures and output are assumed equal,
whilst the net balance between the current account (exports minus imports) and the capital
account (savings minus investments) amounts to zero.
Figure 1. A graphical representation of the computable general equilibrium CGE model framework
(Philippidis et al. [43]).
In addition to standard treatments like GTAP, the MAGNET model includes a list
of non-standard modelling extensions activated by binary modular switches. Indeed,
given the focus of the current paper, MAGNET is a favoured choice of multi-region CGE
model because it offers a superior treatment of agricultural markets. Firstly, the standard
activity classifications in the GTAP database have been enhanced with additional sector
splits for animal feeds, fertilisers, first generation biofuels and their co-products. In this
way, one improves the representation of agricultural production technologies and more
comprehensively characterises the main competing uses of crop biomass (i.e., food vs. feed
vs. energy).
Secondly, the model has a state-of-the-art treatment of agricultural factor and product
markets (i.e., endogenous land supply, differentiated rates of agricultural land transfer
between competing agricultural sectors, differentiated production technologies for crop
and livestock activities, labour and capital agricultural factor market rigidities, production
quotas on raw milk and sugar, conventional biofuels mandates).
Finally, unlike standard single period (i.e., ‘comparative static’) simulation experi-
ments, MAGNET permits multiple time-period simulation experiments (‘recursive dy-
namic’). In this way, the end of period equilibrium solution becomes the starting point for the
next period, which better accommodates gradual structural changes in the world economy
owing to differing rates of projected economic growth, technology and capital accumulation.
2.2. Model Aggregation and Experimental Design
Running the model with the full 141 region GTAP data disaggregation would be
unwieldy due to a lack of available computing power. Instead, a careful choice of regions
is made to fit the focus of the paper. Thus, the EU is represented as a single trade bloc.
Due to its geographical proximity, the Rest of Europe (RoE) is a key trader with the EU.
‘Mercosur’ and ‘Australia and New Zealand’ (AusNZ) are key agri-food net-exporting
regions, whilst in select product categories, the EU has notable trade ties with the United
States, Mexico and Canada (NAFTA) (e.g., cereals, oilseeds); the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) (e.g., cereals, horticulture, dairy); Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) (e.g., cereals);
and Asian (Asia) markets (e.g., rice, pork, dairy). A ‘Rest of the World’ (ROW) region
captures all residual global trade flows. The choice of commodities takes advantage of the
most detailed disaggregation of crops, livestock, feed and food activities in the MAGNET
database. In addition, first generation biofuel activities are included, as well as (rival)
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fossil fuels and energy processing industries. Remaining activities are aggregated into
‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’.
The baseline is projected from 2011 to 2030 (Given the changes in EU agricultural policy
design over time, it was not judged prudent to project the current design of the CAP beyond
this time frame) in three-time steps of 2011–2015, 2015–2020 and 2020–2030. The principle
drivers are population growth and region wide productivity growth to target real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth, which follow the Agricultural Model Intercomparison
and Improvement Project (AgMIP) (For further information on the AgMIP project, see
https://agmip.org (accessed 3 August 2020) reference scenario, based on a ‘status quo’
shared socioeconomic pathway 2 (SSP2) [44]. In MAGNET, regional changes in labour
endowments are assumed to match regional population, the capital stock changes at the
same rate as real GDP (i.e., fixed medium to long-run capital-output ratio is assumed) and
natural resources are projected to grow at one quarter the rate of the change in the capital
stock. Additional land biasing productivity changes are also exogenously implemented,
consistent with SSP2. To improve the veracity of the production response results (i.e.,
through a more accurate depiction of competition for land use), in accordance with the
renewable energy directive (Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 May 2003 on the promotion of the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels
for transport), our experiments assume that by 2020 onwards, the ‘first generation’ biofuel
blending target reaches 7%.
In our experiments, the projection of CAP payments to 2030 is highly detailed, based
on the work of Boulanger and Philippidis [45]. It relies on comprehensive historical official
DG AGRI payments data by MS and associated payment ceiling limits to 2020. As such,
the payment structure captures heterogeneous rates of voluntary coupled support (VCS)
by agricultural activity and the resulting decoupled-coupled support payment split within
the CAP (the presence of VCS is particularly pertinent for beef livestock (paid per head of
cattle) which benefit most from these subsidies). Moreover, rural development support is
classified over five aggregate categories of payment types. For the period 2020–2030, the
structure of payments remains unchanged (i.e., the split between (i) rural development
and (ii) market measures and direct payments is assumed constant, whilst within the latter
category, the division between decoupled and voluntary coupled support also remains
unchanged). In the 2020–2030 period, all CAP payments are deflated by 2% per annum.
CAP decoupled payments are implemented as a uniform agricultural land subsidy
across all primary agricultural commodities [46]. Since land in the model is specific to the
agriculture sector and the uniform payment rate does not favour any agricultural activity,
there are no cross-commodity effects and the payment is modelled as fully decoupled
(MAGNET has an endogenous land supply function such that changes in decoupled
payments on land under this configuration will still generate ‘some’ degree of coupling
effect on output).
As noted, all experiments employ the same CAP baseline shocks. The differences,
however, lie with the degree to which the decoupled payments of the CAP are assigned
across non-land factors [47,48]. More specifically, implementing the same CAP shocks, the
decoupled payment attached to the land factor corresponds to the upper-, medium- and
lower-land capitalisation shares in Ciaian et al. [37], which reflects the ‘low-’, ‘medium-’
and ‘high-coupling’ experiments, respectively. The low coupling experiment assumes that
a majority share of the CAP decoupled payment indicated in Ciaian et al. [37] is capitalised
into the agricultural land factor, thereby minimising the link with agricultural production
decisions, whereas the remaining amount is distributed homogenously across all factors
(unskilled and skilled labour, capital and land). At the upper limit, the ‘high-coupling’
experiment assumes that a larger proportion of the CAP decoupled payment is allocated
to agricultural labour and agricultural capital factors. Since non-agricultural land factors
can leave agriculture more easily, changes in support in the high-coupling experiment are
expected to trigger more visible production effects. The assumptions behind these three
configurations are described in Table 1.
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Table 1. Representation of decoupled payments in the model experiments (2011–2030).
Experiment Experiment Description
Decoupled Share of Payment Coupled Share of Payment Impact on Production
1. Baseline
All decoupled payments are





et al., 2018) of the proportion
of CAP decoupled payment
capitalised into the
agricultural land factor.
Allocation rule for the decoupled
payment share that is not
capitalised into land: In
experiments 2, 3 and 4, to reflect
all remaining coupling-channels
the residual value of the
decoupled payment total is
allocated as a uniform subsidy
rate payment across land,
unskilled-, skilled-labour and
capital factors in the agricultural









lowest impact on farm level
output decisions via other
coupling channels
4. High-coupling
Lower confidence interval EU





highest impact on farm level
output decisions via other
coupling channels
Finally, as noted in the introduction, to examine how different CAP coupling settings
affect economic-, social- and environmental dimensions, and the resulting trade-offs, a
series of representative indicators are chosen as described in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Selected indicators through the prism of sustainability.
3. Results
3.1. Economic Impacts (Output, Prices and Trade)
Figures 3 and 4 present the impacts on EU agri-food production and market prices
from each of the model simulation experiments. With assumed projections to 2030 in real
GDP growth, population and the labour force, rising real incomes and food expenditures
propel demand increases for (inter alia) agricultural and food products, whilst productiv-
ity improvements on land and production technologies, motivate outward supply shifts.
Structural shifts in economic comparative advantage are further compounded when con-
sidering the relative rates of change of these aforementioned drivers across world regions.
In rapidly developing countries, for example, food demands rise much faster prompting
increased import driven trade. At the world level, food demand is matched by agricultural
productivity growth. In the baseline (i.e., full decoupling), the net result is that real world
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agricultural prices fall 8% by 2030 (not shown). This result is consistent with previous
prospective modelling studies [49,50].
Figure 3. Changes in EU agri-food output by experiment and sector. Note: Columns present the
value of output evaluated at market prices (VOM) measured in USD billions in the base year 2011
(left axis), symbols present the percentage changes from 2011 to 2030 in output for each coupling
experiment and the baseline representing full decoupling (right axis). Source: Own computations
using MAGNET.
Figure 4. Changes in EU market price and output by experiment and sector. Note Columns present
the value of output evaluated at market prices (VOM) in USD billions for agricultural (AGRI) and
food commodities for each period of the baseline representing full decoupling (right axis), symbols
present the percentage changes in output quantity (qo) and market prices (pm) for each coupling
experiment and the baseline (left axis) compared to the previous period. Source: Own computations
using MAGNET.
For the baseline between 2011–2030, Figure 3 shows that EU agri-food sector pro-
duction growth ranges between 2% (raw sugar) and 22% (oilseeds). By 2030, aggregate
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EU agricultural and food production rises 14% and 15%, respectively (Figure 4), whilst
bioenergy output (from a small base) rises by 120% (not shown). To some extent, the
smaller percentage increases are calculated from larger (e.g., horticulture, dairy) bases,
whilst differing income elasticities of demand for different agri-food products also explain
the heterogeneity of supply responses across EU agricultural activities. In the case of EU
raw sugar, production remained quota constrained until 2017, whilst the abolition of quota
has generated a major restructuring of the sector across the EU regions, with some EU MS
stopping production altogether. In terms of EU agri-food market prices (green dashes in
Figure 4), over different time periods there is a downward trend due to stronger supply
shifts marked by sustained productivity increases (In the EU, population increases are
only moderate, whilst per capita food demands have already plateaued in wealthier world
regions (Engel’s Law)).
Comparing the baseline with the remaining experiments, a clear output reducing
trend emerges. As stated in Section 2.2, CAP support in the decade from 2020 declines
in real terms (deflated by 2% per annum). The higher is the level of assumed ‘coupling’
(i.e., tied to non-land factors), the more agricultural production contracts with real value
reductions in CAP support as agricultural labour and capital leave the industry.
In the EU, it is estimated that agricultural production falls between 1% (low-coupling)
and 2% (high-coupling) relative to the baseline (Figure 4), which is broadly reflected
across all the agricultural sectors (Figure 3). Whilst not shown, concomitant conventional
biofuel falls are between 10% and 15% below the baseline, due to falls in available biomass
feedstock from the crops sectors (principally oilseeds). By 2030, this translates into a loss of
EU primary agricultural production of between 9.0 (low-coupling) and 15.2 (high-coupling)
million metric tonnes of agricultural production. With the scale of the agricultural supply
reductions, market price rises compared with the baseline become stronger. Figure 4 shows
that under high-coupling, by contrast to the baseline, EU agricultural and food prices rise
by as much as 1.7% and 0.5% by 2030.
The trade distorting implications arising from the progressively greater falls in internal
EU agricultural production are in Table 2. It shows a reduction in agricultural and food
intra-EU trade compared to the baseline experiment of up to −2.3% and −0.7% respectively,
indicating a decrease in self-sufficiency. This general relative trade trend is observed across
all agricultural and food activities, for which the magnitude of the effects become stronger
the higher degree of coupling of CAP support is assumed. Simultaneously, under higher
levels of coupling, a trade shift is observed as a greater proportion of EU imports come
from third-country sources. For example, relative extra-EU imports rise by 1.7%, 1.9% and
2.6% under low-, medium- and high-coupling, respectively. Finally, with reduced levels of
EU food self-sufficiency (food security), extra-EU agri-food exports from all activities drop
compared with the baseline. In EU primary agriculture, the range of these extra-EU exports
falls is between −3.8% (low-coupling) to −6.4% (high-coupling), whilst for processed food
the corresponding figures are −1.3% and −2.3%.
Table 2. Changes (%) in EU trade, by experiment and sector.
Intra EU Trade Extra EU Imports Extra EU Exports
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Agriculture −1.4 −1.6 −2.3 1.7 1.9 2.6 −3.8 −4.4 −6.4
Food −0.4 −0.4 −0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 −1.3 −1.5 −2.3
Bioenergy −11.0 −12.4 −17.6 −8.4 −9.5 −13.3 −0.5 −0.9 −2.2
Feeds −0.8 −1.0 −1.5 0.9 1.0 1.4 −1.3 −1.5 −2.1
Fertilizer −1.1 −1.3 −1.8 −2.4 −2.7 −3.9 0.3 0.4 0.6
Note: Changes vs. baseline in 2030 representing full decoupling. For example, intra EU trade of agricultural
commodities changes −1.6 percentage point less compared to the intra EU changes in the baseline in 2030. Source:
Own computations using MAGNET.
In the non-EU regions, the pattern of the trends is the mirror image of the EU, with
relative increases in agricultural and food production, typically of between 0.1% (low-
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coupling) to 0.4% (high coupling) (not shown). As a result, non-EU region exports rise
to fill the gap left by the EU’s decreasing self-sufficiency. Thus, Table 3 shows how the
magnitude of non-EU agriculture and food exports rises with the assumption of higher
levels of coupling. Noteworthy is the estimated agricultural export gain to Sub-Saharan
African agriculture of up to 2%, which suggests that CAP reform could potentially have a
more significant impact on agriculture in this region than previously thought. The overall
impact of the redistribution of world agricultural and food trade leaves only a moderate
impact on world prices. More specifically, from the low-coupled to the high-coupled
experiment, the world price index of agricultural (processed food) prices rises over the
range 0.20–0.34% (0.1–0.16%) compared with the baseline (not shown).
Table 3. Changes (%) in agri-food trade, by experiment, sector and region.
EU RoE NAFTA Mer-cosur MENA SSA AusNZ China Asia RoW
Aggregated sectors:
Food
High −1.14 0.35 0.56 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.62 0.30 0.25 0.47
Medium −0.75 0.21 0.37 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.40 0.20 0.17 0.30
Low −0.64 0.18 0.32 0.05 0.11 0.21 0.34 0.18 0.15 0.25
Agri
High −3.28 1.61 0.44 0.72 1.74 2.00 0.19 0.94 0.98 1.11
Medium −2.27 1.12 0.30 0.48 1.31 1.41 0.14 0.66 0.70 0.83
Low −2.00 0.99 0.27 0.42 1.20 1.27 0.12 0.59 0.62 0.76
Detailed sectors:
Cereals
High −4.41 1.83 0.67 0.83 3.55 1.39 0.02 0.88 1.89 1.81
Medium −2.84 1.18 0.43 0.54 2.30 0.95 0.00 0.59 1.41 1.26
Low −2.42 1.00 0.37 0.46 1.96 0.83 −0.01 0.51 1.29 1.11
Horti-
culture
High −2.32 1.57 0.33 0.99 1.56 1.71 0.06 0.78 0.66 1.29
Medium −1.84 1.28 0.29 0.82 1.25 1.37 0.12 0.59 0.51 1.02
Low −1.73 1.22 0.29 0.78 1.17 1.29 0.14 0.54 0.47 0.96
Beef
High −1.85 4.01 0.49 0.60 1.46 2.03 −0.42 0.39 0.95 0.61
Medium −1.27 2.73 0.33 0.42 0.98 1.38 −0.26 0.27 0.64 0.40
Low −1.11 2.40 0.29 0.37 0.85 1.20 −0.22 0.23 0.56 0.34
Lamb
High −4.61 3.84 1.16 0.76 2.60 1.99 1.48 1.42 2.08 2.63
Medium −3.15 2.59 0.79 0.52 1.76 1.33 1.03 0.96 1.41 1.76
Low −2.75 2.26 0.69 0.46 1.53 1.16 0.90 0.83 1.22 1.53
Poultry
High −3.55 2.57 1.59 0.60 4.45 8.75 1.72 0.71 2.78 4.55
Medium −2.30 1.58 1.04 0.38 2.87 5.63 1.12 0.46 1.79 2.88
Low −1.97 1.32 0.90 0.32 2.45 4.80 0.97 0.40 1.53 2.44
Pork
High −3.24 5.83 2.68 1.69 5.29 6.94 3.70 1.30 4.19 5.89
Medium −2.12 3.72 1.75 1.09 3.43 4.50 2.42 0.85 2.73 3.78
Low −1.81 3.16 1.50 0.93 2.93 3.85 2.07 0.73 2.34 3.22
Dairy
High −1.80 2.94 0.91 0.35 1.29 1.29 1.00 1.15 1.85 2.47
Medium −1.12 1.80 0.56 0.21 0.76 0.81 0.61 0.72 1.16 1.50
Low −0.94 1.49 0.47 0.17 0.62 0.68 0.50 0.60 0.97 1.24
Note: Table shows percentage point deviations in agri-food trade in the three experiments compared to the baseline representing full decoupling in
2030. Negative changes are highlighted in orange and positive changes in green, the greater the change, the higher is the intensity of the colour. Rest of
Europe (RoE), US, Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), Mercosur (includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela), Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), Australia and New Zealand (AusNZ), Asia includes all Asian countries except China, Rest of the World (RoW).
Source: Own computations using MAGNET.
3.2. Social Impacts (Employment)
While Janker and Mann [51] stress that the social dimension of sustainability still
lacks a clear definition and relies on normative approaches, they conclude that human
rights, employment, and life quality are among the topics that occur most prominent in the
literature. To illustrate the social dimension arising from our varying parameterisation of
CAP support payments, we therefore choose the employment indicator.
Over the period 2011–2030, there are differing productivity rates of improvement
that result in structural changes in the EU economy in favour of manufacturing and
services activities (and away from primary agriculture). Indeed, this structural change
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motivates an aggregate EU employment demand increase of 2.9% in the baseline, leading
to a total employment figure of 225 million workers. Moreover, the competitive edge in
EU agriculture is eroded due to more rapid productivity improvements in agricultural
sectors in other regions of the world, and the reduction in EU voluntary coupled support
payments. Due to these factors, in the baseline there is a steady decline in EU agricultural
and food sector employment.
From the model simulation and accompanying satellite data from Eurostat, it is
estimated that EU agricultural employment falls by approximately 6% to 10.4 million full
time equivalents (FTEs) (Table 4). Decomposing this result into crops and livestock, the
corresponding falls are 6.3% (to 6.4 million) and 4.8% (to 4 million), respectively. The fall in
crops is largely motivated by the 11% employment fall in the labour abundant horticulture
sector. In EU food processing activities, a slightly larger fall of 9% is recorded, with a final
estimated employment figure of 5.7 million people (Table 4).
Table 4. Changes in EU employment by experiment and sector.
Labour Demand
Number of Workers, Absolute Deviation from FD,(1000 head)
Deviation from FD,
(% Points)
FD (1000 Head) Low Medium High Low Medium High
Detailed sectors:
Cereal, oilseeds 2270 −31 −37 −57 −1.36 −1.60 −2.50
Horticulture 2774 −36 −39 −49 −1.15 −1.23 −1.58
Other crops 1307 −14 −15 −22 −1.01 −1.13 −1.60
Int. livestock 1882 −20 −23 −37 −1.05 −1.24 −1.94
Ext. livestock 2131 −18 −22 −34 −0.79 −0.93 −1.48
Aggregated sectors:
Crops 6351 −81 −90 −128 −1.19 −1.33 −1.89
Livestock 4013 −38 −45 −71 −0.91 −1.07 −1.69
Agriculture 10,365 −119 −136 −199 −1.08 −1.23 −1.81
Food 5680 −17 −19 −29 −0.27 −0.31 −0.47
Total: 224,553 −21 −23 −30 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Note: Changes vs. baseline in 2030 representing full decoupling (FD). Source: Own computations using MAGNET.
Comparing the experiments with the baseline clearly shows the employment impacts
arising from different degrees of CAP payment coupling. As more decoupled CAP support
is assigned to labour and capital factors (e.g., progressively higher coupling), the fall in
real CAP support over time encourages an increasingly stronger exodus of these primary
factors from the primary agricultural sector. As a result, the safety-net on agricultural
employment is also eroded. Examining Table 4, in the low-coupling experiment there
is a further relative fall in EU agricultural and food employment of 119 thousand and
17 thousand, respectively. In the high-coupling experiment, this headline employment
figure deteriorates further by 199 thousand and 29 thousand, respectively.
3.3. Environment (Emissions and Land)
With the rise in EU agricultural output reported above, the baseline reveals that EU
agricultural greenhouse gases (GHG) (consistent with SDG target 13.2.) rise by 8% over
the period to 479 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e). It should be noted that this
estimate does not consider environmental abatement strategies (i.e., changing emissions
factors) or other ‘green’ initiatives (a full internalisation of EU environmental policy is
beyond the scope if this study). From this total, 345 MtCO2e come from highly emissions
intensive livestock activities (this is due to the high concentrations of methane (CH4)
emissions in livestock activities). In the rest of the world, the more rapid proportional
rise in per capita incomes and population propel a rise in non-EU agricultural emissions
of 44%.
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Examining the marginal impacts of the other experiments by 2030 (Figure 5), the
falls in EU agricultural (and food) output reported in Section 3.1, are translated into
concomitant GHG reductions. Thus, in the low-coupling experiment, EU agricultural
and fertiliser emissions fall 5.3 MtCO2e (of which 3.6 MtCO2e is from livestock) and
0.7 MtCO2e, respectively. On the other hand, there is a leakage effect in the rest of the
world as emissions from non-EU regions rise 10 MtCO2e, of which approximately 40%
comes jointly from NAFTA and Mercosur. In the high-coupling experiment, EU agricultural
and fertiliser emissions fall by up to 9.2 MtCO2e (of which 6.3 MtCO2e is from livestock)
and 1.1 MtCO2e, respectively. For EU agricultural GHG emissions, this fall is 2% below the
baseline level in 2030. Examining the rest of the world, non-EU agricultural emissions rise
by 17 MtCO2e, of which 13 MTCO2e are concentrated in the livestock sectors.
Figure 5. Changes in GHG emissions by experiment, sector and region. Note: Absolute changes
(MtCO2e) in the experiments vs. baseline representing full decoupling in 2030. Source: Own
computations using MAGNET.
Employing a satellite dataset based on FAO [52], the environmental sustainability
impacts of our model assumptions is also measured in terms of agricultural land usage
(consistent with SDGs targets 15.2 and 15.3). In the baseline to 2030, despite rising EU
agricultural output, EU agricultural land usage falls 1.2%, to 1.8 million square kilometres
(mkm2). Within this EU figure, 1 mkm2 is dedicated to crops and eight hundred thousand
km2 to livestock. On the one hand, this fall in EU agricultural land area is partly due to
the assumed projected rises in EU land productivity (land productivity improvements
are taken from a bottom-up biophysical land use model called IMAGE [53]) and feed
efficiencies in our baseline. On the other hand, it is also linked to the falling rental value
of land due to real reductions in CAP support. As capitalised landowner rental values
fall, the opportunity cost of agricultural land usage increases. This fall in EU agricultural
land in the baseline, contrasts with a concomitant rise in non-EU region agricultural land
usage of 6.4%, or 34.5 mkm2. Despite assumed land productivity increases, strong rises in
non-EU population growth and per capita incomes drive this increasing trend. Overall, by
2030, global agricultural land usage in the baseline experiment rises 3 mkm2, with rises in
arable land of 1.6 mkm2 or 160 million hectares (this estimate is compared with a ‘business
as usual’ increase of 11% in global arable land (165 million ha) recorded by FAO [2] from
2012 to 2050).
In the experiments, land retention within the EU agricultural sector remains higher
than the baseline (Figure 6). This is because under higher assumed levels of coupling,
smaller proportions of decoupled payments are capitalised into land rents (i.e., a larger
proportion is linked to non-land agricultural factors). As a result, the steady reduction
of CAP support in real terms does not deflate the rental value of land as strongly, and
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the opportunity cost of holding land for the owners is reduced (although not shown, our
simulation results indicate that agricultural landowner rents in the EU remain between
6% (low coupling/high decoupling) and 13% (high coupling/low decoupling) higher than
the baseline). Thus, the higher is the assumed level of coupling, the larger is the reduction
in agricultural production and the greater is land retention, implying that agricultural
yields fall by greater amounts. This points to a stronger switch toward a less intensive EU
agricultural management system. Examining Figure 6, the increased retention of land in
EU agriculture is between 13 thousand km2 (low-coupling) and 23 thousand km2 (high-
coupling). On the other hand, in the non-EU regions, land leakage effects are strong, rising
between 14 thousand km2 (low-coupling) to 24 thousand km2 (high-coupling). Much of
these increases are motivated by pastureland rises in Mercosur and Sub Saharan Africa
(Figure 6).
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4. Discussion
Within the EU, the Green Deal has set the tone for a green growth driven strategy of
economic prosperity. As the oldest existing common policy of the EU, CAP reforms over
the last two decades have reflected this growing reality as farmer compliance with green
production practises has spread, whilst agri-environmental rural development policies
have strengthened. In tandem, the EU wishes to be seen as a ‘fair’ trader, where policies
and trade agreements should seek to reduce as feasibly as possible ‘leakage’ effects in
third countries. An increasing amount of oil crops imported into the EU fosters land use
changes in their countries of origin, such as deforestation, which leads to higher GHG
emissions. By way of example, in parts of Asia, significant land clearance for the expansion
of palm plantations has been driven not only by human consumption, but also by its use as
a feedstock for biodiesel. In response, the EU will completely phase out imports of palm
oil from Asia as a means to reduce indirect land use change resulting in deforestation [54].
Currently it is estimated that EU palm oil imports from Southeast Asia (mainly Indonesia
and Malaysia) contribute to about 17% of deforestation associated with total EU oil crops
imports [55]. From the perspective of trade, the majority of CAP direct payments are
classed as non-distortionary, although this claim is refuted by academic literature giv
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the presence of coupling-channels. As a result, these coupling-channels of EU decoupled
payments could have implications for the multilateral trading system and the World Trade
Organisation [56].
Varying the parametrics of coupling of EU decoupled support payments, the resulting
impact shows a systematic degree of deviation on a selection of indicators representing the
three pillars of sustainability. Indeed, the deviation arising from these parametric configu-
rations gives rise to a series of trade-offs from the standard ‘fully-decoupled’ parametric
treatment in the baseline. Moreover, the results suggest that said impacts are amplified the
longer is the time period under consideration. This is of special concern considering the
increasing long-term horizon of policy objectives (e.g., achieving climate neutrality by 2050
in the EU [4]).
Taking the first two of these pillars, in the EU it is apparent that as a ‘safety-net’ for
food security and agricultural employment concerns, the capacity of the CAP is diminished
under higher assumed levels of coupling. At the upper coupling limit of assumed coupling,
the EU agricultural production loss and agricultural employment loss is equivalent to of
the absolute values in Belgium and Hungary, respectively, at the beginning of the baseline
period. Moreover, the loss of food security is also reflected in reduced levels of intra-EU
trade and rising agricultural and food market prices. Although these average EU price
increases are not expected to be significant, in specific localities with lower per capita
incomes, this could still have more serious implications.
Staying with economic and social considerations, from a global perspective, there
are clear signs that if one considers CAP measures as more coupled, trade-led growth
opportunities to third countries with greater comparative advantage in agriculture, are
apparent. This is found to be particularly positive in Sub Saharan Africa. Given the
less mechanised nature of agricultural production systems in many less developed and
developing countries, it is quite plausible that the rise in agricultural employment elsewhere
outweighs the loss of agricultural employment in the EU.
Examining the environmental pillar, reducing CAP support with the assumption of
strong coupling provides a positive message that EU emissions falls are more pronounced.
To contextualise this result, at the upper assumed level of coupling, the fall in EU agricul-
tural emissions is equivalent to 11% of France’s agricultural emissions at the beginning of
the baseline period. When leakage effects are considered, however, the picture changes.
Indeed, by filling the vacuum to supply EU food security concerns, the assumption of
stronger coupling also delivers larger leakage effects as non-EU regions’ agricultural output
rises more strongly through trade. As a result, under the assumption of high-coupling, net
global agricultural emissions rise by 7.8 MtCO2e. The results therefore tentatively suggest
that maintaining real levels of CAP support could have a beneficial impact on controlling
global agricultural emissions.
In their study, Jansson et al. [57] examine the impacts of only removing CAP voluntary
coupled support measures (VCS). They discover that the leakage effects upon removing
all VCS payments, make up approximately 75% of the fall in EU agricultural emissions.
They therefore conclude that VCS is damaging efforts to reduce global emissions. A
comparison with their finding must contend with modelling differences in emissions
factors and structural assumptions (i.e., elasticities, treatment of trade). Furthermore, a key
difference with our study is that they focus exclusively on a narrow set of payments that are
largely linked to specific emissions intensive livestock sectors (in 2018, VCS expenditure
amounted to less than 4 billion euros when decoupled payments totalled 34.4 billion
euros [58]). In our simulation experiment, the real reductions in CAP support and the
resulting decision-making (i.e., coupling) behaviour is pertinent to all crop and livestock
activities. Moreover, only focusing on voluntary coupled support might be expected to
draw a stronger EU production reduction than even the highest level of coupling considered
in our experiments, with the result that EU emissions falls are more pronounced. In any
case, a cursory examination of additional references in the partial equilibrium and CGE
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agricultural modelling literature [59–61] reveals that the issue of leakage remains far
from clear.
Finally, for the indicator of land usage, the picture in the EU is that lower levels
of assumed capitalisation into the land factor (i.e., higher degrees of coupling) result in
greater land retention as the opportunity cost of selling agricultural land for alternate uses
is reduced. Between low- and high-coupling assumptions, relatively higher levels of EU
land retention compared with the baseline are 4.5% to 8.1% of the agricultural land area
of France in the beginning period. As noted, the picture in the EU is of a more extensive
(i.e., lower yields per hectare) agricultural system of land management. At the very least,
higher coupling suggests that potentially more environmentally damaging alternate uses
of EU agricultural land might be discouraged (i.e., urbanisation). In the rest of the world,
however, non-trivial land leakage effects are observed, with an increase in non-EU land
area commensurate with the agricultural land retention areas in the EU.
At the current time, the assignment of decoupled payments to land follows the latest
(i.e., post 2013 CAP reform), and most comprehensive EU estimates of Ciaian et al. [37]. In
the absence of clear estimates, the remaining decoupled support payment is allocated as a
uniform rate payment across all agricultural factors. A significant step forward, therefore,
would be to more precisely understand and quantify the possible share of decoupled
support payments attached to agricultural factors that reflects some or all of the indirect
coupling channels relating to (inter alia) on/off farm-labour retention, access to credits,
risk behaviour and farmers expectations about future payments. Moreover, it is clear that
the CAP is a policy that continues to evolve and adapt to the changing priorities of EU
policy. In this regard, updated estimates for such coupling channels are essential to keep
pace with the changing supply response of farmers to evolving CAP measure designs.
5. Conclusions
The successive reforms over the last twenty years have seen a complete redesign of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It has shifted from a production driven system of cou-
pled support payments to a non-distorting multifunctional policy instrument. The current
CAP emphasises the provision of non-market public goods through rural development
policies, and a system of market measures and direct payments granted independently
from production (decoupled) that are principally designed to maintain farming incomes.
Evidence in the academic literature, however, indicates that decoupled payments may
indirectly influence farmer’s production decisions through a series of ‘coupling-channels’.
To explore this hypothesis, this paper employs the best available estimates from
the academic literature to model different degrees of coupling using an advanced ex-
ante medium term simulation model called the Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium
Tool (MAGNET), complete with numerous non-standard modelling extensions to char-
acterise agricultural factor and product markets. A business as usual baseline to 2030
is implemented consisting of real GDP, population and labour force shocks, a detailed
representation of CAP measures and, to improve the representation of feed-crop biomass
usage, conventional biofuel policy mandates. This baseline assumes that all decoupled
payments have no influence on agricultural production (standard assumption). Three
alternate experiments with different degrees of production coupling are compared with
this baseline.
Through the prism of sustainability, we show that different configurations of coupling
reveal noticeable deviations for economic, social and environmental indicators compared
with the standard ‘fully-decoupled’ model treatment. Moreover, the longer is the time
horizon under consideration, the more these deviations are expected to widen. As a result,
current prospective market and non-market impacts of the actual CAP, or of policy reforms
thereof, are potentially mis-specified. At the very least, it implies that the non-distorting
status of decoupled payments on world markets may be overstated, which also has a direct
impact on greener policy initiatives under the auspices of the Green Deal that promote
fairer trade and the minimisation of leakage in third countries. Until a fuller empirical
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appreciation of all possible coupling-channels is internalised within simulation studies, the
full extent of this bias remains only partly visible.
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